While this blog is not a forum for pure politics, the recent conduct of former Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) members who merged into the Central Reform Union (CRU) was truly appalling. To discard core party tenets—such as opposition to nuclear restarts and the security legislation—simply to chase organizational votes without internal debate is unheard of. I initially wondered why there was so little backlash from the left, but that was likely an illusion created by a biased old media and a conservative-dominant internet. In reality, the voters had already abandoned them; the election results for the CRU were a historic catastrophe.
The Shift in the Political Landscape
Interestingly, the former CDP supporters did not flee to the far-left. Reiwa Shinsengumi collapsed from 8 seats to just 1, and the Japanese Communist Party saw its seats halved from 8 to 4. It appears their votes flowed to the LDP, the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), and Team Mirai. While the DPP’s seat count remained flat, I suspect they gained former CDP voters while losing anti-Ishiba conservative votes back to the LDP. (I may cover Team Mirai in a future post if the mood strikes me).
On the right, while conservative parties were generally steady, the conservative Party of Japan lost its seats. Despite having policies that resonate deeply with the core conservative base, their votes likely shifted back to the LDP.
The Common Thread Among the “Losers”
The four major losers in this election—(1) the former CDP members in the CRU, (2) Reiwa Shinsengumi, (3) the Communist Party, and (4) the Conservative Party of Japan—all share a common trait: a vitriolic and aggressive stance toward other parties and internal critics. Regardless of the validity of their arguments, their style contrasted sharply with other parties that ran on constructive policy platforms. If this result reflects the preferences of the younger generation, these four groups are headed for irrelevance.
A Mandate for Fiscal Expansion
With the Takaichi-led LDP securing a landslide victory, it is now certain that a proactive fiscal policy will be spearheaded by the LDP. While they may consult with the DPP, they no longer need the cooperation of the reflationist wing of the former CDP or groups like Reiwa. As for Nippon Ishin no Kai, I have often expressed concerns about their fiscal stance, but since they seem largely indifferent to macro-fiscal policy, I hope they will refrain from interfering.
Conclusion: Escaping the Shadow of Stagnation
Had the economic stagnation continued from the bubble burst in 1990 through 2030, future historians would undoubtedly have labeled it the “Lost 40 Years.” However, while I don’t consider the Takaichi administration’s policies to be perfect, I evaluate their economic direction as fundamentally sound. If this administration lasts for the next five years, the goal should be to maintain an average real GDP growth rate of over +1.0%.
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